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Market Segmentation for Information Goods with Network 
Externalities  
 
 
 
Abstract 
      Positive externalities characterize the consumption of a majority of information goods 
such as software, various Internet services, and online communities. In a simple model of 
vertical differentiation, we show that network externality is a critical factor for the versioning of 
such information goods. In particular, a multi-product monopolist offers two versions of distinct 
qualities. The underlying rationale is that offering the low-end version expands the network size 
and thus enhances the (network) value of the high-end version, allowing the firm to charge a 
higher price for the high-end version. In addition, we show that the low-quality version may be 
offered for free under very general conditions. Competition between firms producing compatible 
products reduces their incentive to version their products due to the spillover effects in a shared 
product network.  
 
(Information Goods; Network Externality; Market Segmentation) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2
1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Motivation 
Information goods have undergone phenomenal growth in recent decades, to a large extent due 
to the widespread adoption of new technologies such as personal computers and the Internet. 
Information goods are distinguished for their cost structure. A higher quality model of physical 
goods typically has a higher unit cost, but the unit cost of information goods remains flat as 
quality improves. For instance, a higher-quality version of software or music costs just as much 
to reproduce as a lower-quality version. In a vertical setting, recent research by Jones and 
Mendelson (1998) and Bhargava and Choudhary (2001) has examined the effect of this distinct 
cost structure on the market segmentation of information goods. Assuming that consumers have 
constant marginal willingness to pay for quality, they reveal a startling result that, in the absence 
of externalities, a multi-product monopolist offers only its top-quality version. The rationale 
underlying their result is that, in markets with such demand and cost features, the benefits of 
price discrimination do not justify the costs of the resulting cannibalization.  
Besides their distinct cost structure, many information goods such as software, online 
services, and community sites also demonstrate salient network externalities: the larger a 
product’s user base, the greater its value becomes. Such demand-side scale economies mainly 
arise from users’ need to exchange messages and learning tips and transfer data, documents, and 
program files. How would network externalities affect the firm’s versioning strategy? 
Addressing this question is the central task of the present paper. In the presence of network 
externalities, we show that the firm has the incentive to expand its product network through 
second-degree price discrimination. The multi-product monopolist should also offer a lower 
quality version besides its top quality version. Under very general conditions, the low-end 
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version should be offered at/below marginal cost for the firm to fully exploit the network effects. 
Our findings appear to be consistent with observed practices in many Internet services, online 
communities, and certain classes of software. For firms in shared product networks, we show 
that the optimal structure of their product lines may also depend on their comparative quality 
positions.  
1.2 Related Literature  
The present paper is related to the literature in network externality, vertical differentiation, and 
information goods. Compared with conventional markets, markets with network externalities 
(also called “network markets”) are well known for their eccentricities: both market history and 
consumer expectations about future are crucial to network formation (Arthur 1989, Farrel and 
Saloner 1986, and Katz and Shapiro 1985, 1986). These idiosyncrasies of network markets tend 
to complicate firms’ competing strategies. For example, firms are more willing to offer their 
products at below marginal costs to seek an installed-base advantage (“predatory pricing”)(Besen 
and Farrell 1994). Vendors are often able to acquire additional market leverage via offering a 
system of related products, e.g. hardware and software, and document viewer and editor (the so-
called “systems competition”) (Katz and Shapiro 1994). The present paper explores the intrinsic 
optimality of product versioning in the context of network externalities: the firm may offer a 
low-end version (possibly for free) to expand its product network and enhance the value of its 
high-end version.  
In models of vertical differentiation, all consumers prefer the product of the highest 
quality but differ in their willingness to pay (Mussa and Rosen 1978, Gabszewicz and Thisse 
1979, Shaked and Sutton 1982, Gabszewicz et al 1986, Salant 1989). Mussa and Rosen (1978) 
first formalize the general notion that offering quality-differentiated products serves to 
 4
discriminate against heterogeneous consumers. As they also point out, however, the firm need 
not segment its market completely and may “bunch” a group of consumers of different tastes to 
the same product under certain conditions. In a simple and elegant model, Shaked and Sutton 
(1982) show that firms can alleviate price competition by differentiating their products. In this 
literature, the most common consumer utility function involves constant marginal willingness to 
pay for quality (also see Moorthy 1988 and Tirole 1988, besides the papers just mentioned), 
which is adopted in the current paper. Since we address the impacts of network externalities on 
market segmentation in a vertical setting, this present paper also connects these two lines of 
research on network externality and vertical differentiation.  
The extant research on information goods has examined network externalities in 
software, but has not addressed their impacts on product differentiation. Because of the network-
expanding side effect of illegitimate copies, no protection can be the best policy against software 
piracy (Conner and Rumelt 1991). Even though the pirate copies serve a screening role of 
separating the plagiarizers from the purchasers, pirating entails additional costs including legal 
liabilities and differs from adopting a quality-degraded free version. Brynjolfsson and Kemerer 
(1996) empirically test the benefits that a software vendor can extract from its product network.  
They show that products with larger installed bases or following the market standard can claim 
higher prices.  
The Internet has opened new possibilities for distributing and selling information goods, 
which have attracted further research interests (e.g. Bakos and Brynjofsson 1999, 2000, Dewan 
et al. 2000, and Jain and Kannan 2002). Bakos and Brynjofsson (1999) show that bundling large 
numbers of unrelated information goods can be much more profitable than selling them 
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separately. Note that, bundling is a different price-discrimination mechanism than vertical 
differentiation, as the bundle size is not equivalent to the notion of product quality. 
1.3 Contributions of this Paper  
Prior research by Jones and Mendelson (1998) and Bhargava and Choudhary (2001) are 
instrumental in pointing out the role played by the cost structure of information goods—marginal 
costs are constant and independent of quality—in their market segmentation. Because many 
important information goods demonstrate fairly strong network effects, the present paper aims to 
illustrate that presence of externalities makes a crucial difference in the firm’s versioning 
strategy.  
The contribution from this paper is multifold. First, we show that presence of network 
externalities restores the optimality of market segmentation: the multi-product firm should offer 
two versions of distinct qualities instead of one. Intuitively, the firm now has an incentive to 
extend the length of its product line to fully exploit the network benefits. This indicates that, in 
the presence of network externalities, a vendor of information goods may benefit from a 
moderate amount of product proliferation. Our findings thus appear consistent with the popular 
practice of offering quality-differentiated versions among vendors of information goods. Even 
though our current model does not consider the fixed costs of product development, the number 
of quality levels derived in this paper serves as an upper bound on the length of the product line 
when such development costs are taken into account. 
Second, the low-end version should be priced below marginal cost under very general 
conditions. These two versions therefore appear to serve distinct purposes: the low-end version 
mainly expands the product network and the high-end version is the primary revenue generator. 
To some extent, this explains the motive for many firms to offer a free low-end version and a 
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priced premium version simultaneously: the free low-quality version is essential for achieving 
maximum market coverage and enhancing the appeal of the high-end version.  
Lastly, this paper also considers firm’s versioning strategies in competitive scenarios. 
When two firms produce compatible products and share the same network, we show that 
competition may reduce their incentive to price discriminate through product line extension, as 
neither can solely capture the entire benefits from network expansion.  
The rest of the paper is planned as follows. A model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 
examines the optimal versioning and pricing strategies of a monopolist and provides empirical 
evidence. Firms’ market segmentation when facing competition is analyzed in Section 4. Section 
5 discusses the limitations to the model, the robustness and implications of our results and points 
out future research directions. The Appendices contain a notation table and a proof omitted in the 
text.  
2 Model  
2.1 The Product’s Cost Structure  
The marginal cost of this product is assumed constant and independent of quality. We further 
normalize the marginal cost to zero without loss of generality. In our one-period, static model, 
there is no R&D and the available qualities of each firm are assumed fixed (even though firms 
may certainly seek quality improvement in multi-period settings). One may regard the costs of 
product development as being sunk. Therefore, the focus of this paper is to determine the optimal 
structure, instead of the positioning, of a product line in the presence of network externalities.  
2.2 Consumer Preferences and the Product’s Intrinsic Utility  
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In the one-period economy, each consumer has a unit demand for the information good subject to 
her reservation utility, which consists of two components. One is the product’s intrinsic utility, 
the value generated by its inherent features, and the other the network utility, the value generated 
by the product’s network. A consumer of type θ  obtains an intrinsic utility s⋅θ  from a product 
of quality , where s θ  is the consumer’s constant marginal willingness-to-pay for quality. 
Consumers are uniformly distributed on [ ]1,A−  with density 1, where  is a finite positive 
number. Such a distribution of consumer preferences is analogous to that of Katz and Shapiro 
(1985). Since we normalize the product’s constant marginal cost to zero, the negative domain of 
the distribution simply stands for those with below-cost valuations toward the product. This 
negative domain allows us to focus on the market-not-covered case and is not essential for 
obtaining any key results. Clearly, in the absence of externality, those in the negative domain 
would never adopt this product, but they may purchase when the product also has network 
values.  
A
2.3 The Product’s Network Utility  
Since we consider a product with externalities, its product network also generates value for 
consumers. Specifically, network externality increases each consumer’s taste by Qγ , where Q  is 
the network size and γ  is the externality intensity and reflects the increment in consumers’ 
willingness to pay when an additional user joins the network. Since γ  measures the strength of 
network effects, it may vary according to the nature of the product. For example, online 
communities typically have stronger network externalities than regular, non-interactive contents. 
Therefore, when purchasing a product of quality  at price s p , consumer θ  obtains net utility 
psQ −+ )( γθ , where s⋅θ  is the product’s intrinsic value and Qsγ  its network value.   
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In markets of homogeneous goods, the network value of a product often depends on only 
its network size (e.g., Katz and Shapiro 1985). In markets of heterogeneous goods, however, the 
network value of the product may also depend on its inherent features (e.g. Farrell and Saloner 
1986). In particular, in a vertically differentiated market, as we examine here, the product’s 
network value often depends on both its quality and the network size. For example, a higher-
quality piece of software such as word processors, spreadsheets, and multimedia programs 
generates greater network value by allowing its users to share documents with enriched features. 
An online community composed of expert members conceivably produces more insightful 
content than a community of amateurs. Certain interfacing tasks (e.g. exchanging large files) 
feasible for users with faster Internet connections may become less convenient or even infeasible 
between users with slower connections. Advanced features in email such as auto reply and 
spelling checkers help convey an image of being polite and considerate. In the same network, 
therefore, a higher quality product has both higher standalone and network values than a lower 
quality product (see Figure 1). The quality-dependent network utility function ( Qsγ ) is not 
crucial for obtaining our core result on market segmentation. One can readily verify that, under 
the usual quality-independent treatment on network utility, the optimality of market 
segmentation still obtains. 
Since a product of too little intrinsic use may become less compatible with the other 
products and thus mitigate its network utility, we impose a lower bound s  on quality. We also 
impose an upper bound s  on quality, reflecting the state-of-the-art in this information good. In 
the one-period economy, a monopolist naturally makes compatible products to take full 
advantage of the network benefits. We assume that the two firms in a duopoly also make 
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compatible products. Therefore the network size  can be conveniently measured by the total 
unit sales.  
Q
 
1s 1sθ
2s 2sθ
1s 1Qsγ
2s 2Qsγ
2s 1s 12 ss > θ
Q
0 Network Size
Value ($) 
Figure 1. The standalone and network values of products 
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2.4 The Solution Concept  
The available product qualities of each firm are common knowledge. Our solution 
concept is the so-called Fulfilled Expectations Equilibrium, in the sense that at equilibrium the 
network size is exactly as anticipated by consumers prior to their purchases. Each firm 
announces its prices first (the two firms in a duopoly announce their prices simultaneously). 
Rational consumers then form identical expectations regarding the ultimate network size and 
determine whether to purchase, and if so, which product to purchase. Therefore, firms follow a 
Stackleberg strategy vis-à-vis consumers, and the two firms in a duopoly follow Nash price-
setting strategies vis-à-vis each other. 
3 Market Segmentation in a Monopoly 
3.1 The Monopolist’s Versioning Strategy  
 10
Consider a monopolist offering  ( ) compatible products of qualities , , …, 
and  (
N 2≥N 1s 2s
Ns sssss N ≤<<<≤ ...21 ) at prices , , …, and  respectively. Denote 1p 2p Np kθ  as the 
consumer indifferent between purchasing  and  when , and k ss 1−k 1>k 1θ  as the consumer 
indifferent between purchasing  and making no purchase. We thus have  1s
01111 =−+ pQss γθ ,         (1) 
and 
111 −−− −+=−+ kkkkkkkk pQsspQss γθγθ ,    for Nk ≤≤2 ,    (2) 
where Q  is the network size or total sales of all  products.  N
At equilibrium the network size must satisfy  
11 θ−=Q .           (3) 
From equations (1) and (3), we have  
1
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)1( s
psQ γ−
−= .           (4) 
From (1), (2) and (4), we then have  
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−
−
−
−   for Nk ≤≤2 .   (6) 
It is readily verified that the single-crossing property of consumer utility is maintained 
within the entire domain of consumer tastes: for any given product quality, the valuation by a 
consumer of a higher θ  lies strictly above that by a consumer of a lower θ . Consequently, 
consumers with kθθ ≥  (1 ) prefer product  to any lower quality products, and Nk ≤≤ ks
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consumers in [ ), 1+kk θθ  will purchase , where ks 11 =+Nθ . Since consumer distribution has 
density 1, the unit sales of product  are ks kk θθ −+1 . The monopolist’s problem is formulated as  
− kθ
kpp
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kkp
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1(θ ,       (7) 
where 1 =+Nθ  and the kθ ’s (1 ) are given by (5) and (6). For tractability, we make the 
following assumption on externality intensity 
k≤
: 
ASSUMPTION 1. .  
s
s
+
< 2γ
Under this assumption, the second-order condition of (7) is satisfied, as (7) is a quadratic 
function of the prices and its value approaches minus infinity when the Euclidean norm 
. The first-order conditions of (7) with respect to , …,  are  ,...,,(|| 21 ppp Np 1p
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respectively. 
With equations (4) to (6), equations (8) to (10) can be rewritten as 
 021− θ          (11) 
 01 −+kθ ,  for 1,...,2 −= Nk ,       (12) 
 0
)1(
)(
22
1
1
12 =−
+−−
s
ps N
γ
γθθ .        (13) 
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Analyzing the system of first-order conditions (11) to (13) turns out to be a shortcut for 
determining the firm’s quality choice. 
Proposition 1. With network externality ( 0>γ ), the monopolist will sell products  and .   1s Ns
Proof: From (11) to (13), we have  
12)1(...
)1(2
)(
32
1
1
21 <−====<−
+−= Q
s
ps
N
N γθθθγ
γθθ .  
Therefore, the multi-product monopolist only sells  and , but none of the 
intermediate products , …, .    Q.E.D.  
1s Ns
2s 1−Ns
Corollary 1. Absent externality, the monopolist only sells the top quality product   Ns .
Proof: Setting 0=γ  in equations (11) to (13), we observe that 1...21 <=== Nθθθ . Q.E.D.  
Corollary 1 says that, in markets without network effects, bunching consumers of all 
tastes to the top quality product is optimal. The underlying rationale is that, at the same marginal 
cost, any lower-quality product would compete with the top quality good so severely as to reduce 
the firm’s profits. This is precisely the no-segmentation result of Jones and Mendelson (1998) 
and Bhargava and Choudhary (2001).  
Market segmentation by a monopolist has also been examined by Gabszewicz et al 
(1986). They show that the firm sells the maximum number of products if the range of consumer 
income is broad enough relative to the feasible quality range, but sells only the top quality 
product if the range of income is relatively narrow. The difference between their result and our 
Corollary 1 above is driven by the fact that they consider a natural monopolist who always 
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covers the entire market (therefore its market size is fixed) to preclude potential rivals, while in 
the present paper the firm can choose the size of the market to serve.  
Proposition 1 is the core result of this paper. With network externality, the firm segments 
the market by adding a product of the lowest available quality. Presence of network externality 
has therefore restored the optimality of second-degree price discrimination in a situation where it 
would be sub-optimal otherwise. Intuitively, the firm now has extra incentives to extend its 
product line. Offering the low-end product expands the size of the network and thus increases the 
network utilities of the high-end product, allowing the firm to extract more surplus. It is precisely 
this complementary effect between the two compatible products that makes market segmentation 
optimal. Furthermore, the two versions should be maximally differentiated to best contain 
cannibalization.  
A further question then arises: when network externality is present, why does the 
monopolist offer only two, but not more (three, four…), distinct versions? It appears that two 
versions are sufficient for exploiting the network benefits. By manipulating the price of the low-
end product, the firm already gains full control over its network size (see (4)). Adding more 
intermediate goods only exacerbates cannibalization but does not help further expand the 
network. Notice, Proposition 1 is quite robust in the sense that it holds for any positive 
externality intensity γ , but is not sensitive to its specific magnitude.  
We proceed to determine the firm’s optimal prices. With Proposition 1, we can reduce 
problem (7) into one with only two products:  and . Denote their prices as  and  
respectively. The first-order conditions of this reduced problem are (by replacing  and  
in (8) with  and , and replacing  and  in (10) with  and  respectively): 
1s
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s
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1s 1p 2s Ns Np
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Solving these two equations simultaneously gives the optimal prices:  
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The firm’s profits can then be found:  
N
N
ss
ss
2
1
2
1
)2( γγπ −−= . 
Proposition 2 shows that, under certain conditions on the externality parameters, the low-
end product should be priced below its marginal cost. 
Proposition 2. A) (Below-Cost Pricing) The monopolist prices the low-end product  below its 
marginal cost ( ) when 
1s
01 <p
Nss
s
+> 1
12γ ; 
pB) (Comparative static) As γ  increases,  decreases and  increases.  1 Np
Proof: A). Under Assumption 1, the denominator of  is strictly positive, i.e. 
. The numerator of  is negative under the stated condition.   
1p
0)2( 1 >−− Nss γγ 22 1p
B). This part is proved by verifying the signs of the respective derivatives: 
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Q.E.D.  
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According to Proposition 2A, when network effects are sufficiently strong, the 
monopolist would rather offer its low-end version  at a loss. By doing so, the firm can 
effectively enlarge its product network so that the extra revenue derived from the high-end 
version more than offsets the loss incurred on the low-end version. Intuitively, these two 
products are used for quite distinct purposes: the low-quality version is primarily a network 
inflator and the high-quality version primarily a revenue source. For information goods with 
fairly strong network effects (e.g., Internet access, software, and online communities), 
Proposition 2A can therefore explain the simultaneous provision of a priced, premium version 
and a free, degraded version.  
1s
With stronger externalities, the network utilities of both products would increase. This 
would seemingly imply more pricing power for the firm, allowing it to raise the prices for both 
products. Surprisingly, the firm adjusts the prices in opposite directions (Proposition 2B). The 
reason is as follows. When facing stronger externalities, the firm has a greater incentive to 
promote its product network, and the only means to grow its network without incurring more 
cannibalization is through lowering the price of the low-end product. A larger network boosts the 
network utilities of the high-end product, allowing the firm to raise the price of the high-end 
product and reap more profits. The firm’s pattern of price adjustment, therefore, echoes the 
network-inflating role of the low-end product. 
3.2 Empirical Evidence   
For a firm with multiple existing products, Proposition 1 suggests that the optimal product line 
consists of two versions of distinct qualities. In reality, vendors of information goods frequently 
version their products via quality degradation: they develop a high-end version first, and then 
remove certain advanced features to obtain a low-end version (Denekere and McAfee 1996). 
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Since our model does not include the fixed costs of product development, the predicted product 
line structure is likely to be observed where the costs of quality degradation are relatively low or 
negligible.  
Such a two-tier product line structure appears in many categories of information goods 
available on the Internet. For online services such as Internet access, email, and Web hosting, the 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) frequently offer one set of basic services for free but charge a 
fee for the premium services, where connection speed, storage space, and exposure to ads are the 
respective major criterion for differentiation. Similarly, online communities such as ezboard.com 
offer vast amount of free content and services to encourage user participation, but also offer 
premium contents at a fee. Matching services such as Match.com allow one to post his/her 
personal profile (this person can thus be approached by others) for free, but require a 
subscription fee if one wants to approach the others. Quality degradation also exists in varieties 
of software. TaxACT.com offers its standard home-user tax program for free and the deluxe 
version at a price. Full-featured computer games are usually priced but the degraded versions are 
often available as free downloads from the Internet (e.g. those listed under the “Shareware” 
category at www.freegamesonline.com).  
When the costs of deriving the low-end version exceed the benefits from an extended 
network, the firm naturally offers its top quality only. Such examples include operating systems, 
databases, and Enterprise Resources Planning (ERP) systems, where the costs of quality 
degradation are substantial due to their tremendous size and structural complexity. Because these 
products are mainly used by institutional and corporate users, a quantity-based market 
segmentation approach—site licensing—becomes more practical. The modularized structure of 
ERP systems also suits them ideally for bundling. Lastly, our vertical-differentiation approach to 
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market segmentation should be distinguished from goldilocks pricing, which argues that a firm 
should offer three distinct products. Goldilocks pricing is based on the theory of “extremeness 
aversion” in consumer psychology and is not specific to markets with network externalities 
(Simonson and Tversky 1992 and Shapiro and Varian 1999).  
4 Market Segmentation in a Duopoly 
This Section examines firm’s market segmentation when competition is present. Consider two 
firms at unequal quality positions, i.e. one firm’s best product quality is greater than the other’s. 
In the one-period economy, the best quality of each firm is assumed fixed, and our focus is to 
determine the firm’s versioning decision given its relative quality position. Purely for the sake of 
tractability, we assume one firm’s product offerings are all strictly superior to those of the other, 
i.e., we exclude two interleaving product lines. When firms overlap their product lines, the main 
virtue of spatial models—localized competition—is lost, because competition would arise 
between each adjacent pair of products of different brands. Furthermore, the space of permuting 
the firms’ offerings becomes infinite when product decisions are endogenous. For these 
difficulties, multi-product oligopolies with overlapping product lines have not been formally 
addressed in the literature of vertical differentiation (Champsaur and Rochet 1989). 
Without loss of generality, suppose the low-end firm, L, has  products of increasing 
qualities , , …, and , and the high-end firm, H, has 
N
1s 2s Ns K  products of increasing qualities 
, , …, and  (i.e., 1+Ns 2+Ns KNs + sssssss KNNNN ≤<<<<<≤ +++... 2121
KNs +
KNi
s< <... ). In other 
words,  is the highest quality of firm L and  is the highest quality of firm H. Denote  
as the price for product i  (
Ns ip
+≤≤1 ). Each firm attempts to maximize its profits by pricing 
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its existing set of products appropriately. Since we assume that both firms produce compatible 
products and thus share the same network, here the network size in the duopoly is still given by  
1
11
)1( s
psQ γ−
−= ,           (14) 
just as in a monopoly.  
The consumer indifferent between purchasing  and not purchasing is  1s
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,
)1(
)(
1
11
1
1
1
1
s
ps
ss
pp
Q
ss
pp
kk
kk
kk
kk
k γ
γγθ −
−−−
−=−−
−=
−
−
−
−   for KNk +≤≤2 .  (16) 
The simultaneous pricing game may then be formulated as  
 Firm L: ,      (17) ∑
=
+ −
N
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kkkpp
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N 1
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θθ
 Firm H: ,      (18) ∑+
+=
+ −
++
KN
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kkkpp
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KNN 1
1,...,
)(
1
θθ
where 11 =++KNθ  and the kθ ’s ( KNk +≤≤1 ) are given in (15) and (16). The second-order 
conditions of (17) and (18) are satisfied under Assumption 1.  
Transforming the first-order conditions of (17) with equations (14) to (16), we obtain the 
equilibrium sales for each product of firm L: 
 0
2
1
1 ≥=− ++ NNN pθθ , for Nk = ,      (19) 
 01 =−+ kk θθ ,   for 1,...,2 −= Nk ,      (20) 
 012 =−θθ ,   for .       (21) 1=k
 19
Similarly, rewriting the first-order conditions of (18) with (14) to (16) leads to the 
equilibrium sales for each product of firm H: 
0)1(
2
11 >+=− + QKN γθ ,  for KNk += ,     (22) 
 01 =−+ kk θθ ,    for 1,...,2 −++= KNNk ,      (23) 
0
)(2 1
12 ≥−=− +++ NN
N
NN ss
pθθ ,  for 1+= Nk .     (24) 
Proposition 3. Facing high-end competition, the low-end firm offers only one product. 
Proof: From (20) and (21), we see that products , …,  all have zero sales under 
equilibrium pricing. The only product of the low-end firm that could generate positive sales is 
 (from (19)). This suggests that the low-end firm will never segment its market.   Q.E.D.  
1s 1−Ns
Ns
Proposition 3 describes the effect of high-end competition on the versioning strategy of 
the low-end firm. In the current model, firms L and H make compatible products and share the 
same product network, and the network utility of a product depends on its quality as well as the 
network size. At a quality disadvantage, firm L is only able to capture a limited portion of the 
network benefits. Segmenting the low-end market would lead to a larger product network, but 
much of the benefits of network expansion would accrue to its high-end competitor H. Such 
spillover effects in a shared network prevent the low-end firm L from offering more than one 
product, despite the strength of externality. 
We proceed to examine the versioning strategy of the high-end firm H. From (22) to (24), 
 and  are the only two products of firm H that may generate positive sales (the 
intermediate products of the high-end firm all have zero sales according to (23)). This suggests 
KNs + 1+Ns
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that firm H should offer at most these two products. Therefore, the remaining question is: Is it 
more profitable for firm H to offer both  and , or just  alone?  1+Ns KNs + KNs +
1+Ns


N
N
s
p


+
+
N
Np
1
1
+
+
KN
KN
s
p
+
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N
N
s
p
N
N
s
Ns
−Np
+1
34
(2
γ+1
)
2
1
)
(
N
N
s
s+ 1 )N+
s
Ns
1+N
s
γ )+
 With Proposition 3 and the above observation, the pricing game in (17) and (18) can be 
reduced to one where firm L offers  only and firm H offers  and : Ns KNs +
Firm L:  
Np
Max 
 −−
−
+
+
NN
NN
N ss
pp
p
1
1 .       (25) 
Firm H:  
1, ++ NKN pp
Max  


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(26) 
Solving (25) and (26) simultaneously gives the equilibrium prices:  
NN
NNKNNKNN
KN ss
ssssss
p
2)68(
34
1
11
−−
−−=
+
++++
+ γ , N
N
s
ss
−
−=
+
+
1
1
)(
, and 
NN
NNN
N ss
sss
p −−
−=
+
+
1
1
)34(
)(
γ .  
The equilibrium profits (or revenue) of firm H is  
1
2
1
)34((4
8)4(
N
NNNNKN
H s
ssssss
−−
+−−=
+
++
γπ . 
Firm H conducts versioning only when offering both  and  generates greater 
profits than offering  alone.  
s KNs +
KNs +
Proposition 4. When competing with a low-end good , the high-end firm offers two products 
only if its top quality  is sufficiently superior to , i.e.,  
N
KN +s
NKNs γ
γγ
48
24(9400320 +++>+ .  
Proof: See Appendix 2.  
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Therefore, the market segmentation decision of firm H depends on the magnitude of its 
quality advantage over firm L. When firm H offers a second product (besides its top quality 
), reduced product differentiation forces firm L to lower its price, leading to a larger product 
network and thus greater network utilities for each product. As a result, the unit sales of firm H 
will increase. In the mean time, however, firm H’s profit margin will suffer due to the intensified 
price competition. Whether the gain in unit sales exceeds the drop in profit margin crucially 
depends on the quality disparity between the two firms.  
KNs +
In markets with positive externalities, a multi-product monopolist always sells two 
versions of distinct qualities (Proposition 1). In contrast, market segmentation in a duopoly 
demonstrates very different patterns: the low-end firm always offers a single quality version, and 
the high-end firm offers two versions of distinct qualities only when it is at a sufficiently large 
quality advantage. Presence of competition may cripple a firm’s ability to segment its market, 
because it can not capture all the benefits from network expansion through unilaterally 
proliferating its product offerings, but has to bear all the damage caused by cannibalization. 
Propositions 3 and 4 jointly have the following corollary as their special case.  
Corollary 2. Without externality ( 0=γ ), each firm in the duopoly offers only one product.  
Proof: When 0=γ , only the top-quality version of firm L is purchased (from (19) to (21)), and 
the threshold quality in Proposition 4 approaches infinity.   Q.E.D.  
Absent externality, the firms lack the incentive to version their products due to potential 
cannibalization, just as in the monopoly case.   
5 Limitations, Implications, and Future Research 
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5.1 Modeling Assumptions and the Robustness of Results 
As is true with all theoretical studies, our model also employs certain assumptions. The two 
important ones are: 1) each consumer has a constant marginal willingness to pay (MWP for 
short) for quality; and 2) the network utility of a product depends on its quality. When each 
consumer has a decreasing MWP for quality, market segmentation can be optimal even absent 
network externalities (Varian 1997).  Even though decreasing MWP for quantity is a well-
accepted premise in economics, constant MWP for quality is a far more commonly used 
assumption in the literature on vertical differentiation, due to its simplicity and little loss of 
generality. In the present paper, this assumption facilitates comparison between firm’s versioning 
strategies with and without network externalities, and thus allows us to benchmark our results 
with those established by Jones and Mendelson (1998) and Bhargava and Choudhary (2001).  
Even though it is natural to assume that the network utility of homogeneous goods only 
depends on their network size, this treatment need not fit well for quality-differentiated products, 
as discussed in Section 2.3 of this paper and articulated elsewhere by Farrell and Saloner (1986) 
and Conner (1995). Nevertheless, it can be verified that our key result—versioning is optimal for 
the monopolist in the presence of externalities—continues to hold even under this alternative 
assumption, because the same rationale persists: the user base of the low-end version contributes 
to the network value of the high-end version. The basic insight revealed through this study is 
therefore quite robust: network externalities give the monopolist an incentive to extend the length 
of its product line to take full advantage of the network effects.  
5.2 Implications for Practices 
Our analysis indicates that the optimal versioning of information goods may critically hinge on 
their network externalities. However, even for products demonstrating pronounced externalities, 
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their versioning decision should still take into account other factors such as the exclusiveness of 
the network and the costs of versioning. In general, versioning benefits vendors in proprietary 
networks more than those in shared networks. When a product follows an open standard or is 
compatible with other competing brands, its vendor may consider scaling back its versioning 
activities as versioning is less likely to generate the desired benefits. As already discussed in 
Section 3.2, the desirability of versioning also depends on the associated costs, which are mostly 
driven by the product’s structural complexity. For instance, versioning may not pay off for 
products with complex internal layouts and millions of lines of source code such as operating 
systems. 
 Our work also has implications on packaging and versioning certain information goods 
with little inherent externalities. The value of some regular contents such as music, news, and 
other topics of special interests may be enhanced by adding community-type features such as 
comments by critics, dialogue with experts, and peer discussions, etc. In such cases, the vendors 
may benefit from building communities around their products and then taking advantage of the 
resulting network effects through versioning.  
5.3 Future Research 
We conclude by briefly discussing future extensions to this work. Our single-period model 
necessarily ignores the inter-temporal aspects of network formation and product improvement. 
Therefore one extension would be to examine externality’s role in providing successive versions 
with improving qualities in a dynamic setting. Another worthwhile direction is to look at the 
welfare impacts of market segmentation for information goods, which is not addressed in this 
paper.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Table of Notations.  
 
A   A positive constant (  is the lower bound of consumer distribution). A−
ip ’s  Prices. 
Q  Network size or total sales of compatible products. 
is ’s  Product qualities. 
s              The minimum feasible quality. A constant. 
s   The maximum feasible quality. A constant. 
π ’s   Profits/revenue. 
θ   Consumer type or marginal willingness to pay for quality. 
kθ   The consumer indifferent between purchasing product  and product .  ks 1−ks
1θ   The consumer indifferent between purchasing  and not purchasing. 1s
γ   Externality intensity, a measure of consumer interdependence. 
 
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 4. 
We can verify that the equilibrium profit of firm H, Hπ , is a single-peaked function of  (the 
peak occurs when 
1+Ns
NKN
NN
N ss
s
)320(241 γγ −−
+=
+
+ ). Therefore, Hπ  as a function of  has at 
most one peak within . We can then show that 
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],( KNN ss + 0<∂
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